Abstract: While the Internet of Things (IoT) technology has been widely recognized as the essential part of Smart Cities, it also brings new challenges in terms of privacy and security. Access control (AC) is among the top security concerns, which is critical in resource and information protection over IoT devices. Traditional access control approaches, like Access Control Lists (ACL), Role-based Access Control (RBAC) and Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC), are not able to provide a scalable, manageable and efficient mechanism to meet the requirements of IoT systems. Another weakness in today's AC is the centralized authorization server, which can be the performance bottleneck or the single point of failure. Inspired by the smart contract on top of a blockchain protocol, this paper proposes BlendCAC, which is a decentralized, federated capability-based AC mechanism to enable an effective protection for devices, services and information in large scale IoT systems. A federated capability-based delegation model (FCDM) is introduced to support hierarchical and multi-hop delegation. The mechanism for delegate authorization and revocation is explored. A robust identity-based capability token management strategy is proposed, which takes advantage of the smart contract for registering, propagating and revocating of the access authorization. A proof-of-concept prototype has been implemented on both resources-constrained devices (i.e., Raspberry PI node) and more powerful computing devices (i.e., laptops), and tested on a local private blockchain network. The experimental results demonstrate the feasibility of the BlendCAC to offer a decentralized, scalable, lightweight and fine-grained AC solution for IoT systems.
in IoT networks has raised several issues, like capability propagation and revocation [9] . To tackle 141 these challenges, a Secure Identity-Based Capability (SICAP) System is proposed, which enables the 142 monitoring, mediating, and recording of capability propagations to enforce security policies as well as 143 achieving rapid revocation capability by using an exception list [9] . However, the centralized access 144 control server (ACS) becomes the performance bottleneck of the system, and the author didn't provide 145 a clear illustration on security policy used in capability generation and propagation, neither was the 146 context information in making authorization decision considered.
147
To enable contextual awareness in federated IoT devices, an authorization delegation method 148 is proposed based on a Capability-based Context-Aware Access Control (CCAAC) model [20] . By 149 introducing a delegation mechanism to capability generation and propagation process, the CCAAC 150 model shows great advantages to address scalability and heterogeneity issues in IoT networks.
151
Given the requirement that a prior knowledge of the trust relationship among domains in federated
152
IoTs must be established, however, the proposed approach is not suitable universally for all IoT which was directly deployed on resource-constrained devices [22, 23] . The DCapAC allows smart 159 devices to autonomously make decisions on access rights based on an authorization policy, and it 160 shows advantages in scalability and interoperability. However, capability revocation management and 161 delegation were not discussed, neither were the granularity and context-awareness considered. 
Blockchain and Smart Contract

163
The blockchain is the fundamental framework of Bitcoin [6] , which was introduced by Nakamoto 164 in 2008. The blockchain is the public ledger that allows the data be recorded, stored and updated 165 distributively. By its nature, the blockchain is a decentralized architecture that does not rely on a 166 centralized authority. The transactions are approved and recorded in blocks created by miners, and the 167 blocks are appended to the blockchain in a chronological order. Blockchain uses consensus mechanism 168 to maintain the sanctity of the data recorded on the blocks. Thanks to the "trustless" proof mechanism 169 enforced through mining task on miners across networks, users can trust the system of the public 170 ledger stored worldwide on many different decentralized nodes maintained by "miner-accountants," 171 as opposed to having to establish and maintain trust with the transaction counter-party or a third-party 172 intermediary [24] . Blockchain is the ideal architecture to ensure distributed transactions between all 173 participants in a trustless environment.
devices [26] . In FairAccess, the AC policies are enclosed in new types of transactions that are used 183 to grant, get, delegate, and revoke access. However, the scripting language used in Bitcoin allows to 184 transcode two types of AC policies, so that the proposed framework cannot support more complex 185 and granular access control model.
186
Blockchain has shown its success in decentralization of currency and payments, like Bitcoin.
187
Currently, designing a programmable money and contracts, which support variety of customized 188 transaction types, has become a trend to extend blockchain applications beyond the cryptocurrency 189 domain. Smart contract, which emerges from the smart property, is a method of using blockchain to 190 achieve agreement among parties, as opposed to relying on third parties for maintaining a trust 191 relationship. By using cryptographic and other security mechanisms, smart contract combines 192 protocols with user interfaces to formalize and secure relationships over computer networks [27] . Smart As an important factor for secure distributed system, delegation has been recognized as one permission assignment is a many-to-one relation between Subject and Objects, which means that 218 each object is associated with a set of access control lists that save the subjects and their authorized 219 permissions for the object. However, the capability model uses subject oriented permission assignment 220 in which relations between Subject and Objects becomes one-to-many.
221
A subject in the capability model is a human being or device, a object is an entity who offers 222 services or resources, and permission refers to an authorized activity to carry out a particular task or 223 an access resource on an object. In Fig. 1 , the permissions are: R-read, W-write and #-not allowed. For 224 each subject, the capability specifies a set of connected objects which are associated with authorized 225 permissions to access services or resources. The following is a list of definitions in capability model:
226
• S, O and P are sets of subjects, objects and permissions.
227
• in Cap O ⊆O×P is internal capability which defines a one-to-many relation assignment between 228 object and permissions. • ext Cap (S,O) ⊆S× in Cap O is external capability which specifies a one-to-many relation assignment 230 by associating a subject with a subset of internal capabilities. 
Federated Capability-based Delegation Model
235
Delegation is an efficient mechanism to simplify access policy management by building a 236 hierarchical relationship to reflect an organization's lines of authority and responsibility. In essential, a 237 delegation hierarchy is a partial order relation . If x delegates the permissions to y, or y inherits the 238 permissions of x, the delegation relation between x and y could be represented as a partial order y x.
239
A partial order is a reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric relation.
240
To control the delegation propagation and simplify the federated delegation model, we assume 241 that a subject cannot be delegated any new permissions if the subject has already been assigned by ((S1, (O×P1)), (S2, (O×P2)))∈DR, where P2 P1. It indicates that subject S1 delegates subset 246 of P1 to subject S2 as P2.
247
To confine delegation relation propagation steps, it's necessary to set delegation depth to 248 define maximum times whether or not delegation operation can be further performed. Two types 249 of delegation: single-step delegation and multi-step delegation are considered in FCDM. Single-step 250 delegation prevents the delegated subject from further performing delegation; whereas multi-step 251 delegation allows multiple delegate operations until it reaches the maximum delegation depth. Thus,
252
Single-step delegation is considered to be a special case of multi-step delegation with maximum 253 delegation depth equal to one.
254
Multi-step delegation generates an ordered list of delegation relation, called Delegation Path (DP).
255
In general, a delegation path starts from an initial or root ext Cap, and is represented as the following 256 notation:
All delegation paths starting with the root ext Cap construct a hierarchical structure: Delegation
259
Tree (DT). In the delegation tree, each node represents a ext Cap and each edge refers to a DR. The layer 260 of ext Cap in the tree is defined as the delegation depth.
261
Given above discussions, the definitions and functions in FCDM are:
262
• DP⊆DR×DR is an ordered list of delegation relation indicating a delegation path.
263
• DT⊆DR×DR is a delegation relation hierarchy representing a delegation tree.
264
• N maxDepth is a natural number representing maximum delegation depth. • ext Cap node, where N is a natural number set representing delegation depth.
271
In order to illustrate the concepts of delegation path and delegation tree. a set of delegation 272 relations example is list as follows:
According to above delegation relations, all delegation paths can be calculated by applying Path Delegation authorization is mainly to impost restrictions on which subject can be delegated 285 to whom based on delegation authorization rules. In our proposed FCDM, the subject-to-subject 286 delegation authorization relation is defined as follows:
287
• ext Cap, S, C, N maxDepth are sets of capability, subject, conditions for authorization and maximum 288 delegation depth, respectively.
289
• can_Delegate ⊆ ext Cap × S × C × N maxDepth . The relation ( ext Cap S1 , S2, C, N maxDepth ) ∈ can_Delegate means that a subject S1, who is a node 291 in delegation tree with capability ext Cap S1 , could delegate its subset of permissions to subject S2 whose 
Capability-based Delegation Revocation
299
As an important process that accompanies the delegation mechanism, revocation refers to process 300 to nullify the delegated permissions, or attempts to rollback the state before permissions were delegated.
301
The revocation approaches can be categorized into three dimensions [30]: grant-dependency, propagation,
302
and dominance. Our FCDM only considers two dimensions: grant-dependency and propagation.
303
Grant-dependency refers to the legitimacy of a subject who can take away assigned permissions 304 from a delegated subject, and has two types: grant-dependent and grant-independent. Grant-dependent 305 revocation means that only the delegating subject (parent) can revoke the permissions from directly 306 delegated subjects (children). Grant-independent revocation means any ancestor subject in the delegation 307 path can revoke the delegated permissions from the offspring subjects.
308
Propagation specifies the extent of the revocation to subsequent delegated subjects. it can be 309 categorized as cascading and non-cascading. Cascading revocation directly revokes delegated permissions 310 from subject as well as indirectly nullified a set of subsequent propagated delegation relation. While
311
Non-cascading revocation only takes away directly delegated permissions from children subjects.
312
To reduce the complexity in the revocation process, our FCDM enforces grant-independent and 313 cascading rules in delegation revocation. Figure 3 is an example for grant-independent cascading 314 revocation. Revocation authorization can be defined as follows:
315
• ext Cap, S, Ancestor() are sets of capability, subject and Ancestor function, respectively.
316
• can_Revoke ⊆ ext Cap × S × Ancestor(S).
317
The relation ( ext Cap S1 , Ancestor(S2)) ∈ can_Revoke means that a subject S1, who is the 318 ancestor of subject S2, can revoke delegated permissions of S2 as well as all indirect assigned 319 permissions by S2 in subsequent delegation relation. As shown in Fig. 3 , owing to fact 320 that both S1 ∈ Ancestor(S3) and S1 ∈ Ancestor(S4), revocation authorization satisfies the relation
321
( ext Cap S1 , Ancestor(S3)) ∨( ext Cap S1 , Ancestor(S4)) ∈ can_Revoke. As a result, the delegation relation for profiling register entities.
419
In general, the capability specifies which subject can access resources of a target object by associating subject, object, actions and condition constraints. The identity-based capability structure is defined as follows:
where the parameters are:
420
• f : a one-way hash mapping function;
421
• V ID S : the virtual ID of a subject that requests an access to a service or resource;
422
• V ID O : the virtual ID of an object that provides a service or resource;
423
• AR: a set of access right for actions, e.g. read, write, execute; and
424
• C: a set of context awareness information, such as time, location.
425
In the BlendCAC system, an AR is defined as the access right set. For example, the AR can 
Delegation Certificate Structure
430
Identity-based Delegation Certificate (IDC) is in essential a special capability token which specifies the delegation relation. The structure of IDC is represented as follows:
431
432
• V ID S : the virtual ID of a subject who is the owner of the delegation token;
433
• V ID P : the virtual ID of a parent subject that delegates the token to V ID S ;
434
• {V ID C }: a set of virtual ID of children subject that records the delegated nodes; • D: a natural number that indicates the current depth in delegation tree;
436
• W: a natural number that defines maximum delegation width to limit delegable children nodes 437 in {V ID C }; and
438
• DAR: a set of delegated permissions for actions, e.g. authorize capability token.
439
In order to manage delegation relations between IDC, a hierarchical data structure, called Identity-based Delegation Tree (IDT) is defined as follows:
440
441
• S: the virtual ID of a subject who is the owner of delegation tree;
442
• MD: a natural number that defines maximum delegation depth; and
443
• IDC: a delegation certificate that indicates the root node of delegation tree. 
Federated Delegation Mechanism
445
Through encapsulating a delegation certificate structure as smart contract and deployed on 446 blockchain network, the delegation mechanism could be enforced across different security domains in 447 a federated network environment. In the BlendCAC system, the delegator, delegation authority center • Request Authentication: The delegatee sends a delegation request to the delegator to ask for Ethereum has a more matured ecosystem and is designed to be more adaptable and flexible for the and SAML, JSON is lightweight and suitable for constrained platforms.
520
Figure 7: a) demonstrates a delegation certificate example, and the data fields in the data structure 521 are described as follow:
522
• parent : a 20 bytes value to represent address of parent node in blockchain network;
523
• children: a queue to record all address of delegated entities;
524
• depth: a natural number to indicate depth of current delegation certificate in the delegation tree;
525
• delegateWidth: a natural number to constraint horizontal delegation times;
526
• privileges: a set of delegated access rights that delegator has assigned to the delegatee, including
527
-contract: a 20 bytes value to indicate address of delegated smart contract; and
528
-authorization: a set of delegated functions for which the operations are granted.
529
Figure 7: b) presents a capability token data example used in the AC system. A brief description 530 of each field is provided as follows:
531
• id: the auto-incremented prime key to identify a capability token;
532
• initialized: a bool flag used for checking token initialized status;
533
• isValid: a bool flag signifying enabled status to show whether token is valid or not;
534
• issuedate: for identifying the date time when the token was issued;
535
• expireddate: the date time when token becomes expired;
536
• authorization: a set of access right rules that the issuer has granted to the subject, including
537
-action: to identify a specific granted operation over resource;
538
-resource: the resource in the service provider for which the operation; is granted. In this 539 case, resource is defined as granted REST-ful API; and -conditions: a set of conditions which must be fulfilled locally on the service provider to 541 grant the corresponding operation.
542
After a smart contract has been successfully deployed on the blockchain network, all nodes in the 543 network could interact with smart contract using address of contract and Application Binary Interface
544
(ABI) definition, which describes the available functions of a contract. 
Access Authorization Service
546
The access authorization and validation policy is enforced as a web service application based 1. Check cached token data: After receiving a service request from a user, the service provider firstly 558 checks whether or not the token data associated with user's address exists in the local database.
559
If it is failed in searching the token data, the service provider can fetch the token data from the 560 smart contract through calling an exposed contract method and save token data to the local 561 database. Otherwise, the token data is directly reloaded from the local token database for further 562 validation process. The service provider regularly synchronizes the local database with smart 563 contract to ensure the token data consistence. 
Experimental Results
582
In order to evaluate the performance and the overhead of our BlendCAC scheme, two benchmark 583 models, RBAC and ABAC, are also transcoded to separate smart contracts and enforced on the 584 experimental web service system. All transcoded access control models have the similar data structure Raspberry PI 3 Model B with the configuration as follows: 1.2GHz 64-bit quad-core ARMv8 CPU, the 602 memory is 1GB LPDDR2-900 SDRAM and the operation system is Raspbian based on the Linux kernel.
603
Unfortunately, the Raspberry PI is not powerful enough to function as a miner, so all Raspberry Pi 604 devices worked as nodes to join the private blockchain without mining. All devices use Go-Ethereum
605
[41] as the client application to work on the blockchain network. 
Experimental Results
607
To verify effectiveness of our proposed BlendCAC approaches to defense unauthorized access the authorization is failed, the running process will immediately be aborted instead of continuing to 612 carry out all authorization stages. As shown by Fig 9 (a) , the server aborted authorization process 613 due to failing to verify granted actions or conditional constraints that are specified in the access right to the server for an access permission. This test scenario is based on an assumption that the subject has 624 a valid capability token when it performs the action. Therefore, all steps of authorization validation 625 must be processed on the server side so that the maximum latency value is computed. According to the results shown in Fig. 10 , the average total delay time required by the BlendCAC 628 operation of retrieving data from the client to server is 243 ms, which is almost the same as RBAC or the smart contract, time for parsing JSON data from the request, and time for access right validation.
631
The token processing task is mainly responsible for fetching token data from the smart contract and is about 210 ms, which is accounted for almost 86% of the entire process time.
637
The entire authorization process is divided into two steps, token validation and authorization 
669
As the experimental results show, the proposed BlendCAC scheme introduced a small amount of 670 overhead, both at the network layer and the local device layer. The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript: 
